I Myself Am A Scientismist

Reclaims 'scientism' as a virtue. The accusation is confused (nobody determines morality with particle accelerators), but there's a real difference: scientifically-trained thinkers have calibrated their reasoning against hard reality (luminiferous aether, Lamarckism, phlogiston), trained themselves in Doubt, and hold a view of hypothesis-space that corrects for human fallibilities (anthropomorphism bias, the Copernican principle, antipredictions). The tilt-shift-vision Paris/London/Beijing analogy (errors correlate because it's the same faulty reasoner, so lessons transfer even across 'unrelated' domains) and the 'verbal reasoning is selectively shitty' point drive it home. Scott's definition: 'A view of hypothesis-space that accounts for human fallibilities, as revealed by past experiences. And a very high burden of proof.' Sharp and memorable.

Quality 73 · Strong. Strong (73): a clarifying, memorable epistemics essay with a genuine payoff (calibrated doubt as transferable across domains); held FIRM below Excellent as a single-idea philosophical essay.

Claude’s paradigm shift 54 · Moderate. Moderate (54): the reframe of scientism as calibration/doubt rather than science-fetishism is a fresh, non-obvious contribution.

Real-world impact 3 · Moderate. Moderate (3): the calibrated-doubt / antiprediction framing circulates in rationalist epistemics discussion; niche footprint.