Rationalists Are Less Credulous But Better At Taking Ideas Seriously
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Summary
Rebuts the 'rationalists sign up for cryonics, so they must be gullible' argument using two years of LW survey data. Experienced rationalists (2+ years, >1000 karma) actually assign a LOWER probability to cryonics working than proto-rationalists (15% vs 21%, replicated across surveys) — so training makes you less credulous — yet they're far more likely to actually sign up (13% vs 0%). The difference isn't credulity but the meta-skill of 'taking ideas seriously': the Goofus/Gallant lottery where both compute the same positive expected value but only Gallant acts on it. Proto-rationalists form a belief, find it an 'interesting curiosity,' then do what everyone else does; experienced rationalists examine consequences and act strategically. Notes taking ideas seriously isn't always wise (1=2 proofs) but progress depends on someone doing it.
Why this score
Quality 74 · Strong. Strong. A sharp, genuinely data-backed argument (rare) that cleanly separates credulity from the instrumental meta-skill of acting on beliefs, with the memorable Goofus/Gallant framing. Held at 74 by brevity. 74.
Claude’s paradigm shift 48 · Moderate. Moderate. 'Taking ideas seriously' is a moderately novel rationalist framing and the survey analysis is original, though the underlying instrumental/epistemic distinction is familiar. 48.
Real-world impact 3 · Moderate. A rare data-backed argument (two years of LW survey data) cleanly separating credulity from the instrumental meta-skill of acting on beliefs (experienced rationalists rate cryonics lower yet sign up more), with the memorable Goofus/Gallant framing. Conceptual influence within rationalist discourse, no material change — modest RWI.