Democracy is the Worst Form of Government Except for All the Others Except Possibly Futarchy

Argues prediction markets / futarchy as Schelling points. The sharp core: democracy's real value isn't optimal decisions but a fair, unimpeachable Schelling point for legitimacy - ending the succession/peasant-revolt legitimacy wars of pre-democratic states (England ~20 civil wars in 650 years pre-democracy, ~zero after). Prediction markets do the same for factual disputes: unbiased, impossible to credibly accuse of bias, self-correcting - so even if an expert edges a market, the market wins as a Schelling point. A clarifying reframe plus a strong futarchy case (building on Hanson/Stross).

Quality 74 · Strong. Excellent (low): the 'democracy as Schelling point for legitimacy' reframe is sharp, memorable, and widely echoed, paired with a strong prediction-market argument - held just below his polished best by early-blog roughness. ~74.

Claude’s paradigm shift 62 · Notable shift. A fresh, non-obvious synthesis (legitimacy-as-coordination + markets-as-unbiased-Schelling-point) on top of Hanson's futarchy and Stross. ~62.

Real-world impact 4 · Moderate. The 'democracy as a Schelling point for legitimacy' reframe (its value is an unimpeachable focal point that ends succession/legitimacy wars, not optimal decisions) is sharp, memorable, and widely echoed, paired with a strong prediction-market/futarchy argument. Broad, durable conceptual uptake within rationalist/governance discourse, but elite-discourse reach with no material change — mid RWI.