P-Zombies Would Report Qualia

Re-opens the Yudkowsky-Chalmers p-zombie debate by disputing Yudkowsky's claim that an omniscient being would infer qualia from the fact that humans talk about qualia. Scott argues p-zombies WOULD report qualia even without having it: they'd have a 'reportable' vs 'unreportable' mind (the PARIS-IN-THE-THE-SPRINGTIME example), and asked how they know a rose is red, they couldn't answer with neurology or 'my mouth just moved,' so they'd describe receiving a 'packet of visual data' - which, given the 100ms speed of interpretation, can't be an RGB bitmap but must be 'a rich color language that produces an immediate experience of color without further processing' - indistinguishable from 'I experience the mysterious redness of red.' Concludes this is best news for illusionism/deflationary physicalism (explaining why we talk about qualia even if there 'is' 'no' consciousness), though it still doesn't explain the 'someone there' to appreciate it.

Quality 72 · Strong. Strong - an original, clever conceptual argument that makes a genuine contribution to a 15-year rationalist debate (qualia-reports would arise WITHOUT qualia, via the encoding-scheme/rich-color-language argument; the bitmap-vs-immediate-interpretation point is sharp). Held at Strong because it's short and admittedly unresolved (Scott: 'this argument confuses me... I'm not even sure which direction to update').

Claude’s paradigm shift 54 · Moderate. Moderate-to-Notable - a fresh, non-obvious move in an existing debate (the encoding-scheme argument for qualia-reports-without-qualia).

Real-world impact 2 · Minor. Within-discourse philosophy-of-mind essay; no material reach.